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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AN ESCAPE FOR THE ESCAPE CLAUSE VETO?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadhal invalidated the unicameral legislative veto provision in the Im-
migration and Nationality Act' as violative of Article I, section 1 and sec-
tion 73 of the Constitution, the Constitutional soundness of nearly two hun-
dred similar provisions in other legislation has become open to question.
Appellate and lower courts have resolved the issue of such provisions' con-
stitutionality negatively in the context of six other legislative enactments, 4
while Congress is returning to other techniques of post hoc legislative con-
trol.5 The breadth of the Chadha decision, the small amount of case law
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion, with Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joining to form the majority. Justice Powell
concurred on significantly narrower grounds. Both Justices White and Rehnquist dissented.
2. 8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(2) (1982), which was §244(c)(2) of the Act, provided
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section
- if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close
of the session of the Congress following the session at which a case is reported, either the
Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it
does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon
deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under
the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above speci-
fied, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the
Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
3. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §1.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States ...
U.S. CoNST. art. I, §7, cl. 2.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations pre-
scribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, §7, cl. 3.
4. See cases listed infra, in notes 96-102.
5. See, e.g., Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Executive and Agency Actions
After Chadha: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEO. L.J. 801, 804 (1984) (con-
cerning the introduction in S.1650 of combined report-and-wait disapproval procedures);
Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 792-94 (1984). The methods of
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addressing legislative vetoes, the fact that those few cases invalidate them
across the board, and the perceptible shift in Congress' style of retaining
control over administrative decisions, all indicate that the device of the con-
gressional veto has met its end. Several commentators, however, have sug-
gested that the inquiry into constitutionality should be answered differently
according to the use the given veto serves.
6
This Note will consider whether the characteristics peculiar to import
trade legislation provide a basis for arguing that section 203(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974" should survive the Chadha decision, a question not yet
addressed by any court. The inquiry which follows immediately upon a find-
ing of constitutional infirmity is whether the offending provision is severable
either from the section of which it is part or from the legislation as a whole.
This issue is tactically crucial because a finding of inseverability will often
have the same effect as simply allowing the exercise of the congressional
veto. Therefore, the question of section 203(c)'s severability from sections
201 and 202, the "escape clause" provisions, will also be discussed.'
Although the Chadha decision has been extensively analyzed,9 a brief
congressional oversight of executive action apart from the legislative veto are (1) sunset laws
(2) the requirement of Presidential consultation before taking given measures (3) report and
wait procedures which delay implementation of the agency decision for a period in which Con-
gress may legislate contrary law (4) the denial of appropriations in retaliation for actions of
which Congress disapproves. Id. at 792.
6. Breyer, supra note 5, at 790; Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha: The Death Knell for the Legislative Veto?, 69 IowA L. REV. 513, 526 (1984) [here-
inafter cited as Iowa Note]; Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The
Executive on the Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423, 481 (1978).
7. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§2101-2487 (1982); the "escape clause" is section 201
of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §2251,and the legislative veto provision governing it is section 203, 19
U.S.C. §2253(c) (1982). For a general discussion of the operation of the escape clause, see
Garfinkel, Guide to Import Relief and Unfair Trade Actions Available Under U.S. Law, 15
INT'L LAW. 240 (1981); Berg, Petitioning and Responding under the Escape Clause: One
Practioner's View, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407 (1981); Ball, Interpretive History of
the Escape Clause under the Trade Act of 1974, 12 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 531 (1978); Ris,
"Escape Clause" relief under the Trade Act of 1974: new standards, same results, 16 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297 (1977).
8. 19 U.S.C. §2253(c) (1982).
9. Breyer, supra note 5; Levitas & Brand, supra note 5; Iowa Note, supra note 6;
Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legisla-
tive Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Spann, Spinning the Legislative Veto, 72 GEo. L.J.
813 (1984); Note, The Decline of the One-House Veto After Chadha v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service and Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 18 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 943 (1983) [hereinafter cited as New England Note]; Note, Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha: The Legislative Veto Declared Unconstitutional, 86 W. VA. L. REV.
461 (1984) [hereinafter cited as West Virginia Note]; Note, Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha: A Legislative "House of Cards" Tumbles, 8 NOVA L.J. 451 (1984) [here-
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review is necessary in order to apply the decision's reasoning to the escape
clause legislation. Congress had delegated to the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service ("INS") the power to order suspension in the cases of aliens
who satisfied statutory criteria, 0 and had empowered the Attorney General
to enforce this provision." The constitutional dilemma presented in Chadha
was that section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 2 pur-
ported to authorize either House of Congress to invalidate by resolution the
Attorney General's suspension of deportation of aliens. This device of re-
serving to one House the power to override the Attorney General's decision
with a mere majority, allowed Congress to retain continuing control over
specific instances of executive action, and was known as the legislative
veto."3
inafter cited as Nova Note]; Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 226 (1983).
10. 8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(2) (1982).
11. Section 244(a)(1) provides that a deportable alien who applies to the Attorney Gen-
eral and fits the following criteria may be eligible for suspension if he:
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified
in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such
application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good
moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. §1254(a)(1) (1982).
12. 9 U.S.C. §1103(a) (1982).
13. Thus, congressional delegation of power was made to a certain degree conditional on
Congress' ongoing agreement with administrative decisions. At the same time, Congress bore
less political accountability for vetoing a given executive act by such resolution, than it would
by drafting a bill, pushing it through committee, reporting it, voting on the record to pass it,
all in both houses, and then obtaining Presidential signature. The cost of this lost accountabil-
ity is particularly addressed in Spann, supra note 9.
The legislative veto appears in fifty-six different statutes. Its forms are several: the one-
house veto, the two-house veto, the committee veto, the requirement of an affirmative Congres-
sional resolution, the one and one half House veto. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 785. According
to Judge Breyer, three traits are essential. The legislative veto is identified by (1) a statutory
delegation of power to the executive; (2) an exercise of that power by the executive; and (3) a
power reserved by Congress to nullify the executive's exercise of power. Id. at 786.
Many commentators have attempted to categorize these veto provisions by their context
and function. See supra note 9. Strauss, for example, makes the distinction between regulatory
vetoes and political vetoes. Strauss, supra note 9, at 791, 805. See also Dixon, supra note 6, at
470-74.
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II. LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Legislative Action Defined
On the merits,' the Chadha court decided that Congressional exercise
of the retained section 244(c)(2) power was an act legislative "in character
and effect."' 5 Article I, section 1 and section 7 prescribe the bicameral pro-
cess through which legislation is to pass. Under Article I, section 7, clause
2, legislation is also subject to the requirement of presentment to the Presi-
dent for signature or veto.' By effecting a legislative purpose, yet sidestep-
ping these textual requirements for legislative action, section 244(c)(2) ex-
pressly violated the Constitution. Thus, the initial characterization of the
exercise of the section 244(c)(2) power as legislative is crucial.
The Court identified four traits of legislative action. First, the House
resolution revoking Chadha's suspension of deportation had the "purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, in-
cluding the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all
outside the legislative branch. ' 17 The alterations were the change in
Chadha's legal status, and Congress' requiring the Attorney General to pre-
vent the suspension he would otherwise have supported.'8 Second, the veto
supplanted typical legislative action. Absent the veto, the only manner in
which Congress could have obligated the Attorney General to deport a par-
ticular alien whose deportation had been lawfully suspended, would have
been to pass a specific law to that effect, which would first have required a
bicameral majority and Presidential approval. 9 Third, the effect of the veto
was to implemdnt a policy decision of the sort embodied in statutes. Ac-
cordingly, the Court argued that:
[d]isagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's de-
portation . . . no less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the
Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determi-
nations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicam-
eral passage followed by presentment to the President. Congress must
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is revoked.20
14. The Court gave close attention to a number of threshold as well as other substantive
issues, including appellate jurisdiction, severability, standing, alternative relief, jurisdiction,
case or controversy, and the political question doctrine.
15. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
16. See supra note 3.
17. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. at 2784.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2785.
20. Id. at 2786.
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Fourth, this veto did not fall into any of the four Constitutional provi-
sions giving unicameral congressional action the force of law.2" Since the
Constitution painstakingly describes these four cases, the Court reasoned,
only such explicit exceptions to the lawmaking channels prescribed in Arti-
cle I may be recognized.22
Commentators have decried the formalism of this definition of legisla-
tive action. 23 The most pointed argument is that many types of governmen-
tal action seem to fit the abstract definition, whether originating in the ex-
ecutive, legislative, or judicial branch. Agency rulemaking under the
executive aegis is most often cited as legislative action not conforming to
Article I, section 1 and section 7.24 In addition, Professor Strauss notes that
the House may alter legal rights and duties, without adhering to Article I,
section 1 and section 7, in holding witnesses in congressional contempt, and
in ordering investigations. 25 Moreover, the Attorney General's action and
the House action in Chadha's case were indistinguishable: both authorities
attempted to decide the case of a particular individual, according to each
authority's interpretation of whether that individual's case presented the
facts described by statutory criteria. The Court's definition seems to aban-
don a long-standing, although inadequately sharp, distinction between legis-
lative and adjudicative action. Legislative action is action with future effect,
which presents a principle to be applied consistently to a broad range of
similar situations. Adjudication focuses on resolving a present conflict be-
tween parties. 26 This view would have characterized the effect of the veto as
adjudicative, rather than legislative.2 7
In considering whether Chadha should invalidate the Trade Act's es-
21. Id. The four provisions are:
i. Art. 1, §2, cl. 5-The House of Representatives initiates impeachments.
ii. Art. 1, §3, cl. 6-The Senate conducts trials following impeachment.
iii. Art. 11, §2, cl. 2-The Senate ratifies treaties negotiated by the President.
iv. Art. 11, §2, cl. 2-The Senate approves or disapproves presidential appointments.
22. It is unclear whether each of these four traits must be present before action can be
considered legislative. This question serves to emphasize the similarity between the first, sec-
ond and third characteristics given by the Court.
23. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 795-800.
24. Professor Dixon asserts, however, that this analogy is inappropriate because decisions
of these agencies are subject to the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring a
consultative rationalized decisional process; while the Congressional process is, from a juris-
prudential standpoint, basically an irrational process. Dixon, supra note 6.
25. Id. at 795-96.
26. 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 416-20 (1983).
27. The Court chose not to base its decision on the impropriety of the legislative branch
hearing individual cases and assuming an adjudicative function, without the beneficial check of
judicial review. But see Justice Powell's concurrence, 103 S. Ct. at 2788.
1984]
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cape clause, there are therefore several issues. First, under the Chadha
analysis, is the veto's effect legislative? Second, is the veto provision severa-
ble? Third, if academic criticism of Chadha eventually leads to a narrowing
of the decision, it is necessary to inquire whether there is a reasonable basis
for differentiating the section 203(c) veto from the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act veto struck down in Chadha .2 This issue focuses on whether
suggested distinctions in the commentary are persuasive as applied to the
Trade Act of 1974's veto provision, 19 U.S.C. §2253(c).
B. Is the Escape Clause Veto Legislative?
The Chadha Courts's definition of legislative action appears on its face
to embrace the Trade Act's section 203(c). Title 19, section 2253(c)(1) pro-
vides in relevant part:
If the President reports under subsection (b) of this section . that he
will not provide import relief, the action recommended by the Commis-
sion shall take effect . ..upon the adoption by both Houses of Con-
gress (within the 90-day period following the date on which the docu-
ment referred to in subsection (b) of this section is transmitted to the
Congress), by an affirmative vote of a majority of the Members of each
House present and voting . . . of a concurrent resolution disapproving
the action taken by the President or his determination not to provide
import relief under Section 2252(a)(1)(A) of this title. 9
The course of implementing the escape clause and its potential veto by Con-
gress s ° is as follows. An entity representative of a domestic industry may
petition the International Trade Commission ("ITC") under section 201 for
import relief "for the purpose of facilitating orderly adjustment to import
competition."3 1 The ITC then undertakes an investigation to determine
whether an article is being imported into the United States in such in-
creased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the
28. Judge Breyer analogizes Chadha to Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935), for its responsiveness to an extreme situation which the Court has never
identified again. Breyer, supra note 5, at 788. Other commentators have suggested that the
Court may be forced to retreat from the sweeping breadth of the Chadha decision, just as it
did when it narrowed the broad separation of powers decision in Myers v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935). Note, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 192 & n.46
(1983); See also Strauss, supra note 9, at 818.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (1982).
30. The fact that the escape clause veto is bicameral still leaves it objectionable on pre-
sentment grounds.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1982).
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threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article. 2 The ITC reports its findings, deci-
sion, and the basis therefor to the President within six months." The Presi-
dent is to base his decision on whether and in what form to grant import
relief on statutory considerations. 4 After his decision, section 203(c) gives
Congress the opportunity to review the remedy the President proposes, if it
differs from the ITC remedy.
In Chadha the Supreme Court reasoned that Chadha's rights were al-
tered. In the absence of the Immigration and Nationality Act veto, Chadha
would have maintained a legal right to remain in the U.S. Although the
statute did not grant Chadha this right absent Congressional inaction, the
Supreme Court considered this expectation of governmental inaction a
"right" sufficient to undergo legal alteration. By analogy, a domestic indus-
try's rights may be altered by the exercise of section 203(c) of the Trade
Act of 1974. The domestic producers materially injured by imports develop
an expectation of relief once the President finalizes a grant of relief either
by adopting the ITC view, or by modifying it, although Congress under the
statute may then reinstate the recommended form of relief.
The extent to which these two legislative vetoes circumscribe the legal
rights and duties of executive agencies or of the President is different in
relation to each statutory scheme. In the Immigration and Nationality Act
Congress delegated to itself the authority to overturn the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision for the INS to suspend deportation, though Congress had
already delegated to the INS the power to make the deportation decision.
Chadha's fate was decided in the last administrative instance by the Attor-
ney General. The veto circumscribed the INS' authority. The effect of the
section 203(c) veto on the ITC's legal rights and duties, however, presents
an interesting variation. In escape clause cases the ITC renders the final
administrative decision. Unlike the review process in the INS context, the
escape clause veto does not operate to review the agency decision. If the
President simply adopts the ITC recommendation there is no congressional
review." As a result, the agency decision remains intact, free from intru-
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982). The ITC also may undertake the investigation upon
the request of the President, the United States Trade Representative, upon its own motion, or
upon resolutions of the House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee.
19 U.S.C. §2251(b)(1) (1982). This last trigger also raises the legislative/adjudicative quan-
dary. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)-(d)(2) (1982).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982).
35. Note that it is possible to see in a congressional decision not to overturn the Presi-
dent's modification a negative review of the agecny decision. The concern here, however, is
with review of already delegated final authority, i.e., the President's and not the ITC's.
1984]
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sion by the legislative branch. It is difficult to prove that the section 203(c)
veto would alter the legal rights and duties of the ITC.
The argument that the veto alters the legal rights and duties of the
President is more successful. The delegation of authority and discretionary
right to the President to choose the type and amount of import relief is
clearly compromised by the possibility of a congressional veto. The grant of
final decisional authority to the President provides in relevant part:
(a) After receiving a report from the Commission containing an
affirmative finding under section 2251(b) of this title that increased im-
ports have been a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat
thereof with respect to an industry, the President-
(1)(A) shall provide import relief for such industry pursuant to
section 2253 of this title, unless he determines that provision of such
relief is not in the national economic interest of the United
States ....
(b)'Within 60 days. . .after receiving a report from the Commis-
sion containging an affirmative finding under section 2251(b) of this
title. .. , the President shall-
(1) determine what method and amount of import relief he will
provide, or determine that the provision of such relief is not in the
national economic interest of the United States..."
Under the section 203(c) veto, only if the President alters the recom-
mended grant of relief does congressional review occur. Moreover, that re-
view is limited to reinstating the agency decision. Thus, in the escape clause
context it is not the administrative agency decision which is subjected to
legislative veto, but the President's decision itself. The final Executive deci-
sion may be influenced by political considerations which the ITC may not
entertain. 37 To impose congressional review over such a discretionary deci-
sion would indeed alter the executive's legal rights and duties.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (a)(1)(A), (b) & (b)(1) (1982).
37. Reference may be had to President Reagan's deferral of the ITC's recommendation
of selective import relief in 'the recent steel escape clause case. On September 18, 1984, the
President denied the relief which the ITC announced in July 1984 in Inv. No. TA-201-51,
Steel Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 36, 813 (1984). See N.Y.Times, Sept. 19,
1984, at Al, col. 6. The obvious political consideration was the impending presidential elec-
tion, in which the imposition of or refusal to impose a steel quota would have weighed heavily.
The alternative of beginning negotiations for trade agreements with exporting nations carries a
much more remote political accountability.
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The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Consumer Energy Council
of America v. FERC8 supports this result. The Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a congressional veto over regulations promulgated to shift
some of the cost of natural gas deregulation to industrial users was a policy
decision. Consumer Energy held that the veto change the law (or was "leg-
islative" because it narrowed the FERC's discretion.39 When the veto is
used to block regulations not pleasing to Congress, "[t]here is no question
that the effect of a congressional veto is to alter the scope of the agency's
discretion. In this case the practical effect probably was to withdraw the
discretion altogether.- 40 Accordingly, §203(c) fits this prong of the "legisla-
tive action" definition in application to the President.
As to the second element of the definition set forth in Chadha, the only
other method of forcing the President to implement the ITC recommenda-
tion would be to enact a statute. Assuming that the President would not
sign such a bill absent other political conditions making it advantageous to
do so, Congress would be required to muster a two-thirds majority to over-
ride his veto. As to the policy characteristic of legislative action, the third
element of the test, the Supreme Court argued in Chadha that simple disa-
greement with the Attorney General was a policy determination. Congres-
sional disagreement with the President's rejection of the ITC recommenda-
tion is no less a "policy" choice, by this standard.4 ' It may nonetheless be
argued that the policy determination in the use of section 203(c) is less
sweeping. Congress thereby asserts that one executive decisionmaker's pol-
icy (the ITC's) is preferable to another executive decisionmaker's policy
(the President's). In the Chadha situation, however, Congress chose a pol-
icy itself, and then imposed it on the Attorney General as part of his duty
to execute. Finally, since the section 203(c) veto is bicameral, the question
whether it falls under any of the enumerated Constitutional provisions for
unicameral legislative action is irrelevant.
C. Decisional Law
Of the courts treating the validity of legislative vetoes in the aftermath
38. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nora. Porcess Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). See also, New England Note,
supra note 9, and Iowa Note, supra note 6.
39. 673 F.2d at 465.
40. Id. at 469.
41. The fact that adjudicative action may implement policy, though on a different scale,
as clearly as legislative action may do so, merely underscores the ambiquity of the Court's
definition of "legislative action."
1984)
286 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
of Chadha, only two have seriously considered the question of "legislative"
action, and then only obliquely. The remaining five decisions focus on the
severability issue, apparently assuming the presence of an unconstitutional
legislative veto, or attempting to sidestep that question.
EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co."2 was the first decision to measure Chadha's
impact. The district court found that the mere presence of the legislative
veto provision in the Reorganization Act of 1977"' did invalidate the trans-
fer of enforcement authority from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC.
4 4
In summary fashion the court asserted that the jurisdictional transfer did
alter individuals' legal rights.45 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit consequently
considered this issue in a separate case, EEOC v. Hernando, 4 and con-
cluded that the transfer of the Equal Pay Act enforcement power was
valid. 4 7 Thus, Allstate appears presumptively reversible. The Hernando
court stressed the severability of the veto provision, and also referred to the
debated provision as "the unconstitutional legislative veto provision.""
8
Thus the opinion again indicates an unexamined assumption of the veto's
unconstiutionality. Nevertheless, the Court noted, echoing the language of
the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee in Muller v. Opti-
cal Co. v. EEOC,49 that the exercise of a veto provision was distinct from
its mere presence. It continued, "[i]n the instant case, there was no con-
gressional delegation and subsequent withdrawal of delegated legislative
process. Further, no action was taken that affected the substantive rights of
any person."' 0
In Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, the district court found that a con-
gressional veto provision in the Reorganization Act of 197751 did not alter
the legal rights and duties of the interested parties. The plaintiff employer
was defending against suit by the EEOC for age discrimination. Muller
argued that the Reorganization Act's transfer of enforcement authority for
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act52 from the Secretary of Labor
to the EEOC was void, such that the EEOC had no jurisdiction over the
42. 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
43. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-906 (1982).
44. 570 F. Supp. at 1228. The Court was considering a summary judgment motion in a
suit under the Equal Pay Act.
45. Id. at 1228.
46. 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 1190.
48. Id.
49. 574 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
50. Id. at 1192 n.2.
51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-906 (1982).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
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employer.5" The obvious distinction between Muller and Chadha, the court
noted, was that in Chadha, the veto had been exercised. The transfer of
enforcement authority did not involve the use of a veto at all. Though either
House might have used the provision, neither did.5 Secondly, the Reorgani-
zation Act transfer did not "affect any substantive rights," as the legislation
to be enforced had already been approved.55 Muller would eventually face
an age discrimination claim, from one or the other agency. In spite of the
distinctions the court drew, it stopped short of holding that the veto provi-
sion was constitutional.
Indeed, in discussing the severability of this provision, the court re-
ferred to the veto as "the invalidated legislative veto provision.""' Implicit
in the consideration of severability was the likelihood of constitutional infir-
mity. Thus, Muller refused to find that Chadha destroyed the EEOC's au-
thority only two months after the federal district court for the southern
district of Mississippi held the contrary in Allstate.
The Southern District of New York took a cautious approach in choos-
ing whether to follow Muller or Allstate. In EEOC v. Pan American Air-
ways,5 7 the court stayed an order of compliance with a subpoena duces te-
cum in an age discrimination suit. In light of its view that the reasons given
in Muller were "no more or no less rational and persuasive than the reason-
ing relied on in Allstate to support a contrary result" the court simply re-
fused to rule on the merits of the transfer's validity. Rather, it emphasized
that the Supreme Court had noted probable jurisdiction in Allstate, and
that creating a conflict among the circuits would be wasteful."
In sum, these cases reveal judicial reticence to challenge the defini-
tional breadth of Chadha and little attempt to differentiate vetoes. More-
over, no circuit has held that the presence of a legislative veto provision can
invalidate the operation of discrete provisions in the same statute. This
emerging line of authority is particularly significant in the escape clause
situation, since Congress need not exercise its veto to reject the Presidential
remedy decision.
53. 574 F. Supp. at 948-49.
54. Id. at 951.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 576 F. Supp. 1530 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
58. Id. at 1536. The Court denied certiorari on June 11, 1984, holding that it lacked
jurisdiction to review. Justice Burger with whom Justice O'Connor joins, dissented because of
the "significance of not only the jurisdictional but the underlying subdstantive issues presented
by this appeal .... " 52 U.S.L.W. 3889 (U.S. June 11, 1984) (No. 83-1021).
19841
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III. SEVERABILITY
In Chadha, three factors were considered in concluding that the veto
was severable. First, the Court found a presumption of severability in sec-
tion 406 which stated that the invalidity of any particular provision would
not affect the remaining provisions' validity. 9 Second, the legislative history
contained insufficient evidence to rebut this presumption. There was no in-
dication that Congress would have chosen not to delegate the suspension
power at all, had it known that the veto was unavailable as a control device.
On the contrary, the history illustrated the burdensomeness to Congress of
entertaining private bills for each alien, which practice the act was to sup-
plant. Third, section 244 was deemed "fully operative as law" even without
the veto provision.60 Under Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n,61 meeting this test further establishes severability.
The bulk of the case law responsive to Chadha treats the severability
issue. The question is crucial in the escape clause situation. Should the
President select relief differing from the ITC recommendation, proponents
of the President's choice will argue that the legislative veto is unconstitu-
tional, but especially that it is severable from sections 202 and 203. In this
manner, the President's delegated authority to disagree with the ITC would
remain untouched. Opponents of the President's choice would necessarily
contend that Congress would never have delegated such authority without
some continuing congressional control.
A. Legislative History
1. Severability Clause
Unlike the Immigration and Nationality Act considered in Chadha,
the Trade Act of 1974 does not contain a severability clause. Section 605
on "separability" was not enacted, and provided:
If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision to any
circumstances or persons shall be held invalid, the validity of the re-
mainder of this Act, and of the application of such provision to other
circumstances or persons, shall not be affected thereby.62
59. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
60. Id. at 2775.
61. 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1982) Historical Note. Trade Act of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-618,
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (88 Stat.) 2290, 2403.
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Under Chadha, such a clause would raise a presumption of severability.63
Nevertheless, the absence of a severability clause is not dispositive of legis-
lative intent to have an Act fail in its entirety as an inseparable whole."
Without the benefit of this presumption, it is necessary to inquire whether
the "[l]egislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within
its power, independently of that which is not." ' Some of the evidence indi-
cates that the legislative veto provision was integral to the drafting of the
statute, and so inseverable. Other evidence points in the opposite direction.
2. Precursor Statutes
The legislative history of provisions allowing Congress to veto Presi-
dential divergences from agency relief recommendations indicates a con-
tinuity in congressional oversight. A provision in the precursor to the 1974
Act, section 351(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provided for a
concurrent congressional resolution to force the President to implement the
[then] Tariff Commission's relief recommendation. Congress had 60 days in
which to act.6 The presence of this override provision in the 1962 Act sup-
ports the view that Congress would not have delegated this same authority
to the President in 1974 without a similar override.
Prior to the 1962 Act, section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, however, provided essentially the same escape clause protec-
tion for domestic industries, without reserving any veto authority to Con-
gress.6  Instead of a veto, the committee report provided for congressional
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
64. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.7 (1968); EEOC v. Hernando
Bank, 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984). There is also authority for the presumption of insever-
ability inherent in a statute. Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 312-13 (1936). In Consumer
Energy Council, the Court dispensed with the conflict: "We think the question where the pre-
sumption lies is mostly irrelevant, and serves only to obscure the crucial inquiry whether Con-
gress would have enacted other portions of the statute in the absence of the invalidated provi-
sion." 673 F.2d at 442.
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976), (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpo-
ration Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
66. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS (76 Stat.) 1021, 1054; S. Rep. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 3110, 3121.
67. Section 7(c) of the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 50, 1951
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. SERV. 70, 72 provides that:
Upon receipt of the Tariff Commission's report of its investigation and hearings, the
President may make such adjustments in the rates of duty, impose such quotas, or make
such other modifications as are found and reported by the Commission to be necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury to the respective domestic industry. If the President does
not take such action within sixty days he shall immediately submit a report to the Coin-
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control by requiring the President to be accountable for the decision not to
apply recommended relief:
If, after the Tariff Commission has completed its investigation, the
President does not take the escape action recommended by it, he must
submit a report to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Com-
mittee on Finance stating why he has not made the adjustments or
modifications recommended. 8
It is important to remember, however, that the legislative veto had not
gained as great a currency in 1951.'0 It is impossible to evade the argument
that the Chadha severability test becomes less meaningful the further one
casts back in time. Eventually it signifies little to inquire whether a delega-
tion would have been made without a congressional veto to rein it in. The
inquiry must therefore be limited to asking whether a Congress which did
have access to a legislative veto would have delegated this authority to the
President without such a veto. In 1951 Congress clearly thought some ac-
countability was required of the President. Whether it would have used a
veto to achieve that accountability, had the veto been available, is not
known.
3. Legislative History of the 1974 Act
An inquiry into statutory purpose may be helpful, since examination of
the history of section 203 itself does not reveal an unequivocal answer. Sec-
tions 202 and 203 appear in trade statutes, the main purposes of which are
delegating authority over trade relations to the executive branch. Placing
sections 202 and 203 in the larger context of the entire Trade Act illus-
trates how Presidential authority to choose escape clause relief in these sec-
tions helps effect the overall purposes of the Act to "foster economic
growth," "eliminate barriers to trade," "establish fairness and equity in in-
ternational trading relations," and especially "to provide adequate proce-
dures to safeguard American industry and labor against unfair or injurious
import competition. .. ,,o
mittee on Ways and Means of the House and to the Committee on Finance of the Senate
stating why he has not made such adjustments or modifications, or imposed such quotas.
Id.
68. Section 7, Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, S. Rep. No. 299, 82nd. Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. SERv. 1465, 1467-68.
69. Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment on Legislative Perogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977).
70. 19 U.S.C. §2102 (1982).
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The Act was a massive renewal of the delegation of trade relations
authority to the President:
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in the Congressional ple-
nary authority to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts" and to "regu-
late commerce with foreign nations." Since 1934, Congress has periodi-
cally delegated to the President specific and limited authority to
conduct negotiations with other countries for reciprocal tariff and trade
concessions ...
As passed by the House, the bill represented the largest delegation of
trade negotiating authority to the Executive in history. The Finance
Committee's Amendments seek to establish appropriate and constitu-
tionally sound guidelines and criteria to govern the exercise of the au-
thority granted by the bill. The intractable nature of modern barriers to
trade, both tariff and nontariff, make this grant of extensive negotiating
authority to the Executive necessary.7"
The grant of authority was undisputedly considered expedient to effecting
the statutory purpose, so that this expediency supports severability.
In addition, Congress took care to establish criteria for the exercise of
this authority. First, it stated its intent thus: "That relief ought not to be
denied for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the merits of the
case as determined under U.S. law."17 2 Next, section 202 enumerates the
factors the President must consider.7 3 These safeguards also suggest the
veto's severability, as they preempt to a certain degree the veto's control
function. Finally, it was only when the Committee reported the bill that
§203(c), allowing Congress to require the President to implement the ITC
- recommended relief, was added. 74
Several additional points, however, more persuasively support the argu-
ment that absent the override provision, the authority on choice of import
relief embodied in section 202 might not have been granted. First, although
section 202 did provide criteria, a closer look reveals these guidelines to be
71. S. Rep. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7186, 7196. Note that it may have been "necessary" but other trade bills failed to pass.
It was clearly advisable, as the grant facilitates the exercise of inherent Presidential powers to
negotiate. Negotiation would proceed, probably more clumsily, without the grant. Thus, since
the grant simply enhances executive power, a veto over it could be made essential; the costs of
the defeat of the section as a result would not necessarily be excessive. See discussion, infra
Section IV.
72. 19 U.S.C. §2252 (1982).
73. Id.
74. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7196, 7205.
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factors for the President's consideration. The President weighs them as he
thinks best in his discretion. Since the final decision involves balancing fac-
tors, no "correct" decision is immediately apparent. Thus, proponents of
inseverability would understandably argue that these guidelines are an in-
adequate alternative means of controlling the grant of power to the Presi-
dent. Rather, the criteria in section 202 illustrate a subordinate purpose to
delimit the President's exercise of satutory authority. In light of the broad
purposes of the statute,7 5 it is clear that section 202 was meant to vest the
President with added negotiating power. In light of the subordinate purpose
of limiting that power, the section 203(c) veto appears to have been the
most obvious and effective means.
Finally, a brief examination of section 203(h)(4) illustrates the extent
to which sections 202 and 203(c) are intertwined. That section allows the
President later to modify the relief finally imposed, after consulting with
the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce. The bounds of that power are
simply that a consultation is required; after all, the power to alter the relief
after the fact implies a decision which is less politically flammable. While
section 203(h)(4) stands alone, the section 203(c) veto is explicity cross-
referenced to the more impressive grant in section 202 of the power to mod-
ify or deny the recommended relief. All things considered it is more logical
to perceive the inseverability of sections 202 and 203(c) from each other
than to view the veto as severable from section 202.
As a review of the statute illustrates, good arguments may be made for
either result, severability or inseverability. The absence of a severability
clause is not dispositive of the issue. The precursor statutes present a con-
gressional habit of seeking control of trade policy authority, but are incon-
clusive as to the method of achieving it. The purposes of the statute empha-
size the need to vest negotiating authority in the President. At the same
time, the structure of sections 202 and 203 demonstrate an attempt to limit
the use of the section 202 power to given circumstances. Probably the most
astute observation on the issue is that there is at present an inescapable bias
towards finding severability, because of the government structure at stake.7 6
Indeed, because of the wide dispersion of legislative vetoes in sundry stat-
utes, "the repercussions [of inseverability] would topple significant govern-
ment institutions."7 In application to the escape clause context, the reper-
cussions of a finding of inseverability could be more extensive than a finding
of severability. Inseverability would dismantle the governmental mechanism
for settling industry-wide import trade disputes. It would excise entirely the
75. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
76. Levitas & Brand, supra note 5, at 807-09.
77. Id. at 809.
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President's role, leaving the decision in the ITC' hands. Of course, Con-
gress' role would also be removed. A finding of severability, in comparison,
would leave the ITC and Presidential roles intact.
B. Decisional Law
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 8 reiterates the principle that absent an affirm-
ative showing that a veto provision is essential to the statute, the provision
is severable. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, in hearing a suit
for gasoline overcharges under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, decided that legislative veto
provisions in those Acts were severable. 9 The jurisdiction of the TECA
thus was valid.
Like the Trade Act, the EPAA and EPCA have no severability
clauses. Looking to the legislative history, the court reasoned that "[wihile
the stated purposes of the EPCA include a reference to the congressional
veto, it does not follow that the veto provisions are inseverable.8" Moreover,
records of heated debate, illustrating the fragile compromise between exec-
utive and legislative power effected by the EPCA were not equivalent to a
clear indication that the Act would not have passed without its veto.8' The
absence of these clear indicators also led the Fifth Circuit in Hernando to
find that the legislative veto in the Reorganization Act of 1977 is severable.
While one Congressman argued that the veto was integral to the bill, his
view alone could not overcome the general absence of such expressed intent
within the legislative history and the statutory language. 8
In American Federation of Government Employees v. Pierce,8" a
clause containing a veto provision was held inseverable from the preceding
part of the same sentence. Thus, the HUD Appropriation Act, without the
clause, would have placed a blanket prohibition on reorganization costs
before a certain date. This inflexible approach was in indisputable conflict
with the legislative history. The Allstate"' court departed from the general
trend in finding the legislative veto in the Reorganization Act to be insever-
able simply because Congress' intent to control Presidential choices was evi-
denced by the presence of the veto provision. This reasoning seems highly
unpersuasive as it ignores what Congress might have done if told the veto
78. 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984).
79. Id. at 805.
80. Id. at 803.
81. Id. at 804.
82. Hernando, 724 F.2d at 1191.
83. 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
84. 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
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was not available. On the other hand, speculation as to what Congress then
might have done may also be unpersuasive. In fact, these findings of sever-
ability and inseverability are all predicated on what Congress did do.
Where severability is the result, the absence of legislative history pointing
to massive insistance or inclusion of a veto is important. When one court
stops to point out that such absence is irrelevant since the veto was enacted,
it simply underscores the impossibility of imagining what Congress might
otherwise have done.
The final factor to consider in determining severability is whether what
remains after severance is "fully operative as a law."8 In Chadha, what
remained after severing section 244(c)(2) was an authorization of the At-
torney General to suspend deportations in defined circumstances, and a re-
quirement that he report all suspensions to Congress. The Court noted that
section 244 resembled the "report and wait" procedure approved in Sibbach
v. Wilson." Congress is thus notified of its chance to pass blocking legisla-
tion, which would fully conform to the dynamics of Article I.
Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, comprising the three sections per-
taining to general import relief, sections 201, 202, and 203, presents a co-
herent administrative procedure. The ITC conducts an investigation under
§201 to determine:
[W]hether an article is being imported into the United States in such
increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the
threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or di-
rectly competitive with the imported article. ..
Under section 202(a), the President must provide import relief on re-
ceiving the ITC's affirmative injury finding, unless he "determines that pro-
vision of such relief is not in the national economic interest of the United
States. ."88 Section 202(b) requires the President to make this decision
and to choose the method and amount of relief usually within 60 days.89
Section 202(c) lists nine economic factors which the President must con-
sider in making his determination.9" Finally, Section 203(a), 19 U.S.C.
§2253(a), provides five possible types of relief the President may choose to
implement his decision. The Executive may impose or change duties, tariff-
85. Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234.
86. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
87. 19 U.S.C. §2251(b)(1) (1982).
88. 19 U.S.C. §2252(b)(1) (1982).
89. 19 U.S.C. §2252(b) (1982).
90. 19 U.S.C. §2252(c) (1982).
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rate quotas, quotas, orderly marketing agreements, or any combination of
these.91 Section 203(b), 19 U.S.C. §2253(b), requires the President to
transmit his proposal to Congress, and to set forth the reasons for any de-
parture from the ITC recommendation, whether he chooses different relief
of decides that import relief is not in U.S. interests. 92
Section 203(c) contains the legislative veto provision which Congress
may exercise within 90 days. 98 Removal of section 203(c)(1) and (2) would
leave the prior provisions fully operative. Congress would be free to pass a
statute to oppose the President's divergent proposal. The single complica-
tion arises in scheduling any congressional action. The severed section
203(c)(1) and (2) also would remove the 90 day period for congressional
disapproval. Under section 203(e)(1), however, import relief finally deter-
mined takes effect within 15 days of determination, unless a marketing
agreement is involved. 94 Significantly, section 203(h)(4) allows the Presi-
dent to reduce or terminate the relief finally imposed if he determines this
action is in the U.S. interest, after consulting with the Secretaries of Labor
and Commerce." Thus, as discussed above, to a certain degree, the veto's
role in delimiting Presidential discretion to fashion import relief, is already
neutralized by later, unfettered presidential authority to modify that relief.
IV. DISTINCTIONS AMONG LEGISLATIVE VETOES
Federal courts have now considered the constitutionality of legislative
vetoes in the Reorganization Act of 1977,96 the Emergency Petroleum Allo-
cation Act, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,9" the Presidential Re-
cordings and Materials Preservation Act,98 the Immigration and National-
ity Act,99 the HUD Appropriation Act, 00 the Natural Gas Policy Act of
91. 19 U.S.C. §2253(a) (1982).
92. 19 U.S.C. §2253(b) (1982).
93. 19 U.S.C. §2253(c) (1982).
94. 19 U.S.C. §2253(e)(1) (1982).
95. 19 U.S.C. §2253(h)(4) (1982).
96. EEOC v. Allstate, 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983); Muller Optical Co. v.
EEOC, 574 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983); EEOC v. Pan American Airways, 576 F. Supp.
1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§751-760(h) (1982) (legislative veto provision at §757(e)(2)); 42 U.S.C.
§§6201-2 (1982) (legislative veto provisions at §§6239, 6240, 6261, 6421, 6422). See In re
Department of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 578 F. Supp. 586 (D. Kan. 1983);
Gulf Oil v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984).
98. 44 U.S.C. §2107 note (1982). See Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1983).
99. 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1503 (1982) (legislative veto provision at §1254(c)(2)). See 103
S.Ct. 2764 (1983).
100. Pub. L. No. 97-272, 96 Stat. 1160, 1164 (1982). See American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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1978,101 and the FTC Improvements Act.102 None draws distinctions among
the vetoes to reflect the myriad statutory contexts where they appear. In the
words of one commentator, "use of the veto as an instrument of the contin-
uing political dialogue between President and Congress, on matters having
high and legitimate political interest to both, and calling for flexibility for
government generally, does not present the same problems as its use to con-
trol, in random and arbitrary fashion, those matters customarily regarded
as the domain of administrative law." 10 3
Unlike vetoes over agency rulemaking, which are most often criticized
as the type of veto that epitomizes an escape from political accountabil-
ity,' O° inadequate legislating of standards for agency action,'10 5 and an ex-
clusion of rightful Presidential power,' 0 6 vetoes used in high-profile political
areas such as national security and foreign affairs may transfer greater au-
thority to the Executive. International agreements and the setting of tariffs
are together one such area of "direct presidential initiative and responsibil-
ity.' 0 7 Moreover, where both Congress and the Executive have constitu-
tional powers in a certain region of government, the congressional veto can
enhance the harmonious exercise of overall federal power.10 8 For several
reasons, a veto on the exercise of presidential discretion over import relief
falls in this category of political accommodations between branches of
government.
First, both Congress and the President have spheres of direct influence
over international trade. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce of foreign nations.'0 9 At the same
time, Article II, section 2 describes the President's constitutional power
over external affairs." 0 Among others the power is granted to make treaties
101. 15 U.S.C. §§3301-3432 (1982) (legislative veto provision at §3342). See Consumer
Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Process Gas Con-
sumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (1982) (legislative veto provision at §57a(l)(a)). See Consumers
Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. United States Senate
v. FTC, 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983).
103. Strauss, supra note 9, at 791-92.
104. Breyer, supra note 5, at 796.
105. Strauss, supra note 9, at 810-811.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 806.
108. Strauss, supra note 9, at 817; Breyer, supra note 5, at 787.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
110. Article 11, §2 provides that the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, that the President will receive ambassadors and ministers, that the President will ap-
point ambassadors, ministers and councils subject to Senate confirmation.
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with foreign nations with the advice and consent of the Senate.11 1 Thus,
treaties concerning foreign trade require an interweaving of legislative and
executive branch initiative.
Because of the difficulty and delay involved in obtaining the two-thirds
Senate majority necessary for treaty-making, the device of executive agree-
ments shares the field with Presidentially negotiated foreign compacts.112
The executive power to make such agreements does not rest on a textual
Constitutional grant as does the treaty-making power. It does rely to a cer-
tain extent, however, on Constitutionality derived authority. Nevertheless,
statutory authority, and then authority subject to Congressional approval,
usually precede implied constitutional power as the sources of the Presi-
dent's executive agreement power.' Thus, the President may make inter-
national agreements entirely independently of Congress. ""
The practical limitations on this power illustrates the necessity in this
context of a high degree of power sharing between the legislative and exec-
utive branches. First, unlike self-executing treaties, it is unlikely that a non-
self-executing agreement can supersede a prior inconsistent statute. But,
like treaties, they can be superseded by later legislation. Finally, unless self-
executing they require implementing legislation as do treaties. 1 5 The es-
sence of an executive officer is the ability to act decisively and immediately
when necessary; the executive agreement serves this concept. Yet the execu-
tive agreement, and thus the efficacy and credibility of the executive as
negotiator, are vulnerable to hostile Congressional action or inaction. Thus,
the various statutory accomodations of the executive foreign affairs power
with congressional claims can only intensify the executive's foreign clout.
The purposes of the Trade Act of 1974, which enacted the present
escape clause and accompanying congressional veto, are given in 19 U.S.C.
§2102:
The purposes of this chapter are, through trade agreements affording
mutual benefits -
(1) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in the
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, §2.
112. It is agreed, however, that the two types of compact are not mutually exclusive in
scope. See e.g., Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation,
17 J. AIR L. & COM. 438-44 (1950).
113. DEP'T OF STATE, CIRCULAR No. 175, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §311.1 (1966),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (L. Henkin, R. Pugh, 0. Schachter & H. Smit eds.
1980).
114. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
115. Lissitzyn, supra note 112, at 444.
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United States and to strengthen economic relations between the United
States and foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world
trade;
(2) to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate barriers to trade on a ba-
sis which assures substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for
the commerce of the United States;
(3) to establish fairness and equity in international trading rela-
tions, including reform of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
(4) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American indus-
try and labor against unfair or injurious import competition, and to
assist industries, firm [sic], workers, and communities to adjust to
changes in international trade flows;
(5) to open up market opportunities for United States commerce
in nonmarket economies; and
(6) to provide fair and reasonable access to products of less devel-
oped countries in the United States market." 5"1
The comprehensive listing begins by designating the general means of pro-
ceeding: through trade agreements. The Act represents a working dynamic
between the executive's power to negotiate executive agreements on trade,
and Congress' power to regulate commerce. By delineating the situations
where imports, fair and unfair, will be penalized, Congress enhances the
executive negotiating power. To illustrate, the Presidential discretion over
escape clause relief allows the President to reject unilaterally imposed quo-
tas and tariffs for the chance of negotiating trade agreements with originat-
ing nations."16
Secondly, the established tendency of the executive and Congress to
use power sharing statutory schemes in the foreign trade area is strength-
ened by the distinctly implicative constitutional interpretation given to for-
eign affairs grants of power. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.1
7
is the classic example; the Court concluded that Congress may make more
extensive delegations of foreign affairs powers to the President than it
might in internal affairs, although the constitutional text is sparse in the
former area. 1 8 Finally, the validity of delegations of executive authority
conditional on the finding of statutorialy defined facts, which are remarka-
bly similar to the power sharing function of certain legislative vetoes," 9 is
115.1. 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1982) (empahsis added).
116. 19 U.S.C. §2253(a)(4) (1982).
117. 299 U.S. 304"(1936).
118. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 6, at 436-38.
119. Strauss, supra note 9, at 816 (noting that the two distinctions between constitution-
ESCAPE CLAUSE
also more leniently examined from the foreign relations perspective.' 2"
If indeed sections 202 and 203 were to be found inseverable from each
other, then these two provisions represent Congress' attempt to fashion its
power sharing mechanism. Insofar as this mechanism actually enhances
Presidential power to negotiate abroad, the Trade Act's assignment of exec-
utive and legislative functions may not directly run afoul of the rationale
behind the proper separation of powers. This power-enhancing capacity dis-
tinguishes the escape clause veto from the regulatory type of veto to which
is ascribed the vice of political unaccountability. Legislative vetoes over the
decisions of independent regulatory commissions are especially suspect as
they seek to control an executive agency process from which the President
has already been excluded. While the ITC is an independent commission, it
is not a rulemaking body. 2' Moreover, the escape clause petitioning process
over which it presides does not exclude the President. Rather, the ITC
serves the function of investigating and analyzing empirical data in order to
report to the President. Its independence is in its analysis. But the ITC
investigation's primary reason for existence is to create a basis for Presiden-
tial decision and action.
Assuming, then, the validity of Professor Strauss' distinction between
political and regulatory legislative vetoes," 2 the escape clause veto in many
ways exhibits the positive aspects of a "political" legislative veto.
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen that under Chadha's strict analysis, the exercise of the
ally valid contingent delegations and political veto arrangements are that Congress in the lat-
ter does not give the standards for the exercise of retained authority, and that it is the legisla-
ture, usually a subcommittee thereof, not the executive, that decides whether the conditions
are met).
120. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), upheld the tariff act allowing the President to
shift imports to a fee schedule upon his finding of mandated facts.
121. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982).
122. Thus far, only the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized this view, in applica-
tion to State constitutional issues. Strauss, supra note 9, at 812. In General Assembly v.
Byrne, 90 N.J. 576, 448 A.2d 438 (1982), the court found a provision allowing both houses of
the legislature to veto any state agency rule both an intrusion into executive process and an
"unconstitutional mechanism for legislative policy making beyond the Governor's control." 448
A.2d at 439. In Enourato v. New Jersey Building Authority, 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449
(1982), however, the same court held that a legislative veto to approve or reject building
projects that require ongoing appropriations did not violate the state presentment clause. The
veto could not "disrupt executive branch functions," as it was so limited. 448 A.2d at 451.
Further, not every action by the Legislature would constitute lawmaking requiring a bicameral
majority and presentment. The court concluded that the veto could foster cooperation between
the legislature and the Executive as an area of mutual concern. Id. at 452.
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escape clause veto would probably be "legislative."1 23 At the same time,
such a ruling would present a question of degree because the section 203(c)
veto simply shifts the President's discretion in time to its potential exercise
under section 203(h)(4). The issue would be whether this time-alteration of
discretion is enough an alteration of rights and duties to be "legislative."
Next, under the case law a court would likely find the section 203(c) veto to
be severable."" By the same token it can be forcefully argued that it is
severable from the legislation as a whole only if the section 202 grant of
power falls with it. Finally, given that greater interpretative flexibility has
been warranted in the past towards grants of power to the executive in ex-
ternal affairs, and given that section 202 enhances the executive trade bar-
gaining position, the section 203(c) veto would be a qualified candidate for
preservation, should Chadha's span ever contract.
Mira Davidovski
123. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
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